As is broadly recognized, the realm of administrative power greatly expanded over the course the twentieth century (particularly after 1945). This essay argues that this expansion, along with differential conceptions of legitimacy deeply bound up with it, are crucial to understanding not just the modern administrative state but also the nature of EU governance and the law governing its operation. Despite a dominant paradigm that seeks to understand EU governance in autonomously democratic and constitutional terms, the legitimacy of integration as a whole has remained primarily 'administrative, not constitutional'. The EU's normative power, like all power of an ultimately administrative character, finds its legitimacy primarily in legal, technocratic and functional claims. This is not to deny that European integration involves 'politics' or has profound 'constitutional' implications for its member states or citizens. The 'administrative, not constitutional' paradigm is meant only to stress that the ultimate grounding of EU rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication comes closer to the sort of administrative legitimacy that is mediated through national executives, national courts, and national parliaments to a much greater extent than the dominant paradigm supposes. This is the reality that the 'administrative, not constitutional' paradigm on EU law has always sought to emphasize, and it is one that is particularly pertinent to the integration process in times of crisis. It is unsurprising, in these circumstances, that the public law of European integration has continually resorted to mechanisms of nationally mediated legitimacy in order to 'borrow' legitimacy from the national level. Unless and until Europeans begin to experience democracy and constitutionalism in supranational terms, the 'administrative, not constitutional' paradigm suggests that the EU's judicial doctrines must be adjusted. The purpose should be to address the persistent disconnect between supranational regulatory power and its robust sources of democratic and constitutional legitimacy on the national level.
Introduction
Allow me to ask the reader to reflect for a moment, by way of introduction, on the differences between the legitimacy of a 'constitutional' legislature (say, a national parliament) and that of a merely 'administrative' body (say, an executive department or, in more recent times, an independent agency). In modern governance, both types of institutions are generally experienced as legitimate producers of rules of general and prospective application, albeit in different contexts and under different constraints. The rules produced by administrative bodies are, legally at least, generally experienced as inferior to, indeed even dependent upon, the rules produced by legislatures. For lawyers, this is a straightforward question of the hierarchy of norms. But behind that sense of normative hierarchy is in fact a complex socio-historical phenomenon of legitimacy that is anything but straightforward. The rules produced by administrative bodies-'regulations', 'ordinances', 'statutory instruments', as the case may be-may in the lawyer's mind be selfevidently subordinate to 'legislation'. But we also know that, as an historical matter, the realm of administrative power greatly expanded over the course the twentieth century (particularly after 1945), in a way that has significantly altered, and perhaps even diminished, the role of national parliaments. What do these broader socio-historical shifts suggest about the differential legitimacy of rulemaking in these different types of bodies, administrative and constitutional?
As this essay seeks to show, this question is crucial to understanding not just the modern administrative state but also the nature of EU governance and the law governing its operation. The emergence of the EU over the last six and a half decades presents a fascinating case study in legal and political change in which varying conceptions of legitimacy-administrative, democratic and constitutional-have played a crucial role. As a consequence, to understand the nature of EU governance and law we must confront the variable nature of legitimacy in more theoretical depth. In particular, we must pay special attention to mediated legitimacy, which serves as a bridge between the modern administrative state and European integration.
Administrative versus democratic and constitutional legitimacy
Let us begin with a schematic overview of the possible types of legitimacy of administratively produced norms as a way of exploring the variable character of legitimacy in modern governance more generally.
First, administratively produced norms are generally experienced as at least legally legitimate when they are understood to remain within the substantive and procedural constraints of the enabling legislation and the constitution. Furthermore, these norms are often experienced as technocratically legitimate when they are seen as the product of administrative expertise derived from informed evidence gathering and reason-giving (by contrast, norms produced by constitutional legislatures are not, generally speaking, subject to the same expertise-based constraints). Additionally, administrative rules are experienced as functionally legitimate in the face of the perceived incapacity of constitutional legislatures to produce norms of the scope and depth needed to address 'modern problems'-a claim often used to justify delegations of normative and regulatory power to supposedly more capable administrative actors.
I This functional necessity is also often at the heart of the willingness to confer normative autonomy and independence on administrative bodies, at least when the technocratic justification combined with the desire to insulate from 'politics' is also strong (factors felt acutely but not exclusively in the realm of central banking, for example).
II
Despite the force of these alternative claims of administrative legitimacy-legal, technocratic, and functional-they have arguably not been sufficient to give legitimacy to administrative rulemaking along one final dimension: democracy. The national legislature remains the presumptive expression of this particular form of legitimacy, a privileged role derived from eighteenth and nineteenth century developments and often inscribed in the constitution itself. This is not a normative claim -regarding the nature of democracy in some idealized or scholarly conception -but rather a socio-historical one, about the manner in which people actually experience democracy in a pragmatic, if admittedly imperfect sense. Over the course of the twentieth century, increasingly plebiscitarian 'chief executives' (heads of state or government) undoubtedly became a competing source of this E -5 sort of experiential democratic legitimation in many systems, particularly in providing hierarchical oversight or control within the burgeoning administrative sphere. Nonetheless, nearly all constitutional systems continue to reserve at least one core normative domain to the legislature: the power to define the precise circumstances of compulsory societal mobilization, whether human (defence or policing) or fiscal (taxing, spending, and borrowing). In this crucial domain, robust democratic and constitutional legitimacy via the historically 'constituted' legislature continues to be experienced as essential; mere administrative or even plebiscitarian executive legitimacy would not be enough. Courts and court-like bodies, like the French Conseil d'Etat, also play an important democratizing role here, by policing the constitutional boundary between democratic politics (legislative and executive) and the realm of administrative actors, while also defending individual rights.
Mediated legitimacy and the boundary between democratic politics and administrative power
We live, or at least hope we still live, in an age where democracy is the ultimate legitimating baseline of modern governance. Administrative norms are generally not experienced as democratically legitimate in themselves, particularly if they are produced with some measure of autonomy and independence from hierarchical political control.
Moreover, even if not legally mandated (as with independent agencies), such autonomy is in some sense unavoidable, simply by virtue of bureaucratic density and complexity.
Lacking democratic and constitutional legitimacy of their own, administratively produced norms are normally experienced as at best derivative of the legitimacy of democratic and constitutional institutions that reside elsewhere in the system. The struggle to define a workable, pragmatic boundary between democratic politics and administrative power -one cognizant of our underlying socio-historical experiences but yet sensitive to the functional demands of modern governance -was in fact central to the Such accountability mechanisms may be understood as a system of 'resistance norms', operating 'as a "soft limit" which may be more or less yielding depending on the circumstances', to borrow a powerful distinction first advanced by Ernest Young (2000:1504) . Rarely do these norms prevent the exercise of delegated authority outright; rather, they serve to raise the costs to the agent of using that power (cf. Stephenson 2006 Stephenson , 2008 , while having the added benefit of simultaneously reducing the information costs to the principal, thus enabling more effective oversight. In this way, oversight serves to maintain a legitimating connection between the burgeoning, often autonomous realm of administrative governance and the 'paradigmatic function' of the historical institutions of constitutional government-legislative, executive, and judicial-that we inherit from the past (Strauss 1987:493) .
Relevance to the competing paradigms: the 'administrative, not constitutional' character of European integration
At this point, the reader may want to press the question: What do these various forms of legitimacy in modern administrative governance-most importantly delegation constraints and mediated legitimacy-have to do with the topic of this Special Issue: understanding the competing paradigms in EU law in times of crisis?
The answer is simple, even if the theoretical argument is ultimately complex: Despite a dominant paradigm that seeks to understand the EU in autonomously democratic and constitutional terms, the legitimacy of EU governance as a whole remains primarily 'administrative, not constitutional' (Lindseth 2010). The EU's legitimacy, in other words, is derivative of the member states, qua constitutional 'principals', which choose to delegate regulatory and disciplinary power to EU institutions to act as its 'agents'. This is not to deny that European integration involves 'politics' or has profound 'constitutional' implications for its member states or citizens (so too did the expansion of administrative power on the national level over the course of the twentieth century, by the way). . The 'administrative, not constitutional' label is meant only to stress that the legitimacy of EU rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication comes closer to the sort of administrative legitimacy that is mediated through national executives, national courts, and national parliaments to a much greater extent than is commonly supposed. In that respect, European integration can be said to build upon the postwar constitutional settlement, even as it also disrupts it in significant ways, by virtue of seeking to translate that settlement into workable supranational terms.
The strongest indicator of the EU's lack of autonomous democratic and constitutional legitimacy is so fundamental that it is puzzling why EU legal scholarship so often ignores it.
I am referring to the unwillingness of Europeans to grant EU institutions any macroeconomically or geopolitically significant powers of compulsory mobilization of fiscal or human resources. These sorts of powers, as noted above, remain the core attribute of national parliaments even in the era of administrative governance and is also the strongest indicator of their privileged position as sources of democratic and constitutional legitimacy in modern governance. The EU's autonomous fiscal resources are limited to a supranational budget amounting to roughly one per cent of the aggregated Gross National Income (GNI) of the member states, and only a small portion that budget is derived from the EU's 'own resources' (most importantly, customs duties as well as a small percentage of the VAT collected at the national level). The remainder is derived from member state contributions, which are politically negotiated and derived from resources mobilized nationally. Beyond this limited fiscal dimension, there is the near total absence of any autonomous mobilization of human resources in the crucial domains of policing or defense, apart from limited staff available for border-control support via Frontex as well as even more restricted policing and defense coordination via entities like Europol and the European Defence Agency (EDA).
III All other mobilization of fiscal and human resources in the EU ultimately depends on the more robust democratic and constitutional legitimacy of national parliaments, a limitation that has had a real impact on EU capacities in the face of various recent crises-the Eurozone, refugees, and terrorism. Without such legitimacy, the EU becomes a primarily normative, regulatory entity-a powerful one to be sure, but nonetheless one whose authority depends almost entirely on the member states to mobilize the resources needed to enforce its norms. The purpose of the mechanism of nationally mediated legitimacy is to address, not a democratic deficit as it is commonly called, but a democratic disconnect at the heart of the integration process. My insistence on this alternative conceptual vocabulary is deliberate.
The 'deficit' view implies that the legitimacy challenge is simply one of institutional engineering: how to ensure broader powers for the elected EP (or perhaps for the electorate itself through the European Citizens' Initiative) in order to make up for the legitimacy shortfall that prevents the EU from becoming an autonomous level of democratic and constitutional governance in a quasi-federal system (for a critique, see
Weiler 2011). The 'disconnect' view, by contrast, stresses the dynamic at the heart of the EU's ultimately 'administrative, not constitutional' character: the separation of regulatory power from democratic legitimacy in EU governance. The challenge facing the EU is not one of fixing a 'deficit' but overcoming, in a more socio-political way, the 'disconnect' between the EU's regulatory power and its sources of democratic and constitutional legitimacy at the national level. The 'disconnect' view derives from an empirically based historical recognition that, at this point in Europe's development, such democratic and constitutional legitimacy at the EU level is lacking. Consequently, European elites cannot easily engineer that legitimacy into existence, as the 'deficit' claim implies, at least in the short or intermediate term.
'Coming to terms' with EU law… despite what EU judges, lawyers, and law professors maintain
So how shall we 'come to terms' with this complex reality of governance in the EU?
We should understand the phrase 'coming to terms' in two senses that play off each other with, but also that directly contradict, the dominant constitutionalist paradigm of EU law.
From its earliest articulation, the administrative perspective sought to understand EU law in terms of the tensions raised in this conflict between the EU's constitutionalist logic and its administrative character:
Regardless of the scale or constitutionalist pretense of an international regulatory organization, without this cultural foundation of democratic legitimacy, all we are left with, from the standpoint of popular perception, is a technocratic body-a supranational administrative agency-with an attenuated relationship to the perceived ultimate source of the agency's normative powers: the participating states severally as representatives of their 'sovereign' peoples. The temptation to ignore this attenuated relationship, perhaps to read it out of the problem … in my view simply lays the groundwork for serious, on-going democratic-legitimacy problems in supranational bodies (Lindseth 1999:736) .
Over the last decade and a half, it has become increasingly clear how much these 'ongoing democratic-legitimacy problems' also directly negate the 'constitutionalist pretense' of the EU. The emergence of genuine constitutional legitimacy is, in the modern era, intimately linked to the socio-political and socio-cultural underpinnings of democratic sovereignty itself (Ackerman 1991; Rubenfeld 2001). As Neil MacCormick (1999:173) has taught us, this emergence is tied to the sense that a particular political community, as a collectivity, sees itself as 'entitled to effective organs of political self-government' through institutions that the community then constitutes for this purpose. At the heart of this peculiarly modern notion of democratic self-government is the legitimate capacity to extract and redirect fiscal and human resources on a societal scale. Constitutionalism is anchored in this capacity, dividing powers and protecting rights in order to subject compulsory mobilization to the rule of law.
Perhaps, then, it is time to abandon that 'constitutionalist pretense' of the EU, regarding it as an 'infant disease' à la Pescatore (1983) . Where would that lead us? As the bullet points set out below suggest, this could certainly have a major impact on how the CJEU should approach its job. (Indeed, this has always been the primary purpose of the administrative perspective, not simply to change our descriptive understanding but also our legal framework for interpreting EU action.) To regard the EU as primarily administrative (or 'sub-constitutional') need not mean abandoning the functional concerns over legal diversity or weakening protection of fundamental rights. But it would involve heightened sensitivity to the risks of supranational encroachments on national democracy, entailing a much more explicit balancing of the functional demands of 'pre-commitment' against the rights of the various European demoi to continuing democratic self-government.
This interpretive shift could manifest itself legally in several possible ways: VIII  Policing the boundaries of competences conferred on the EU with much greater rigour, in recognition that these sorts of constraints are a typical feature of modern administrative governance and must be enforced in the interest of democracy;
 Within the boundaries of power indisputably conferred on the EU, taking a much more demanding approach with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, both in terms of substance and procedure, enforcing the requirements of the Subsidiarity Protocol rather than following the CJEU's own highly deferential jurisprudence on the question;  As to any ambiguities with regard to the appropriate legal basis for EU legislation, favouring interpretations that maximize national democratic rights (i.e., unanimity bases-to the extent they still exist-over qualified-majority voting bases);
 Adopting a more cautious attitude toward further 'agencification', which, despite obvious functional benefits, also further attenuates the chain of democratic and constitutional legitimacy flowing from the national level (a concern that extends to
Treaty-based expert bodies like the ECB); Oct. 1993 , BVerfGE 89, 155, [1994 ] 1 CMLR 57, 33 ILM 388 [1994 , specifically at 439 (rationalizing transfer of control over monetary policy to the European Central Bank 'in order to ensure that currency is not vulnerable to pressure groups or to holders of public office seeking re-election'). III Just prior to the submission of this article, a cohort of nineteen member states (including France, Germany, Italy and Spain) announced efforts to create a Cooperative Financial Mechanism, or CFM, to provide funding for joint military projects. The details will be negotiated over the next year but according to published reports, contributions will be voluntary and the monies in the fund will be owned by national governments (Emmott 2017). Aside from the voluntary contributions, therefore, the contemplated model would seem to follow that of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which was established to financial assistance to member states of the Eurozone in financial difficulty. 
